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LETTER
Low-carbon transition is improbable without
carbon pricing
Jeroen van den Bergha,b,c,d,1 and Wouter Botzend,e
Rosenbloom et al. (1) downplay the role of carbon pric-
ing in climate policy. We counter their criticisms.
The authors claim that framing climate change as a
market failure fails to appreciate it is a “system prob-
lem.” This overlooks that market failures, such as neg-
ative/positive externalities and public goods/bads,
represent a clear systemic perspective on problems
and policies (2). Carbon pricing (CP) is, moreover, a
prime example of systemic policy: It simultaneously
shifts choices of consumers, producers, investors,
and innovators in all sectors—essential to a low-
carbon transformation (3). We agree that additional
instruments supporting innovation and escape from
carbon lock-in are needed. Historical absence of CP
contributed, though, to current lock-in.
The authors suggest that CP means efficiency is an
overriding policy priority. However, efficiency requires
effectiveness. CP is highly effective as no decision in
the economy escapes its influence, resulting in closure
of all behavioral and economic holes through which
emissions leak. It therefore better limits energy/carbon
rebound than other instruments (4). For example, CP
discourages spending savings from energy conserva-
tion on high-carbon goods, as these will be more ex-
pensive. This said, it seems Rosenbloom et al. (1) do
not value efficiency much. Inefficient policies contrib-
ute, however, to less emissions reduction for a given
cost, lower incomes, and unemployment—which will
hamper stable political support.
The authors neglect that CP is critical to innovation.
However, CP contributes to steering innovations to-
ward low-carbon products and production, because
private investors are influenced by price expectations
as these codetermine profit opportunities (5). Further-
more, unlike other instruments, CP stimulates among
“clean” technologies the cleaner ones, like solar pho-
tovoltaic (PV) panels with low-carbon lifecycles (6).
The authors prefer a context-sensitive over a uni-
versal approach. However, sector-specific approaches
tend to be ad hoc, costly, and susceptible to lobbying,
while causing intersectoral carbon leakage. Moreover,
climate policy is bound to remain weak if it is fragmented
between jurisdictions. Policy harmonization is needed to
weaken freeriding and international-competitiveness
concerns that hamper stringent policies. A CO2 price
facilitates comparison and harmonization of national
policies (7).
Regarding political realities, the authors suggest
CP faces much resistance. However, this holds for all
serious climate policies. No evidence is provided
that other effective instruments receive more polit-
ical support. On the contrary, CP is quite popular:
Almost 60 jurisdictions have implemented it in some
form (8).
While CP has been criticized as inequitable, this is
not the case if it is complemented by appropriate
revenue recycling (9). In fact, no other instrument gen-
erates revenues for compensation. To compare, adop-
tion subsidies for rooftop solar PV or electric vehicles
even use up money and are inequitable by going to
well-off households.
It is not true that CP is only supported by neoclassical
economics. Many types of empirical and theoretical
studies underpin its effectiveness, including agent-
based models describing boundedly rational and so-
cially sensitive behaviors (10).
The literature on low-carbon transitions offers
creative policy ideas. It is time that CP is integrated
with these into a more complete theory of transition
policy.
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